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Abstract—As we seek to deploy machine learning models beyond virtual and controlled domains, it is critical to analyze not only the
accuracy or the fact that it works most of the time, but if such a model is truly robust and reliable. This paper studies strategies to
implement adversary robustly trained algorithms towards guaranteeing safety in machine learning algorithms. We provide a taxonomy to
classify adversarial attacks and defenses, formulate the Robust Optimization problem in a min-max setting, and divide it into 3
subcategories, namely: Adversarial (re)Training, Regularization Approach, and Certified Defenses. We survey the most recent and
important results in adversarial example generation, defense mechanisms with adversarial (re)Training as their main defense against
perturbations. We also survey mothods that add regularization terms which change the behavior of the gradient, making it harder for
attackers to achieve their objective. Alternatively, we’ve surveyed methods which formally derive certificates of robustness by exactly
solving the optimization problem or by approximations using upper or lower bounds. In addition we discuss the challenges faced by most
of the recent algorithms presenting future research perspectives.
Index Terms—Artificial Intelligence, Deep Learning, Robustness, Adversarial Examples, Robust Optimization, Certified Defenses.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning (DL) ( [1]) models are changing the way we
solve problems that have required many attempts from the
most diverse fields of science. DL is an improvement over
Artificial Intelligence (AI) Neural Networks (NN), in which
more layers are stacked to grant a bigger level of abstraction
and better reasoning over the data when compared to other
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms ( [2]). Since the raise of
DL, supported in many cases by cloud environments [3], [4],
[5], the base architecture and its variations have been applied
in many scientific breakthroughs in the most diverse fields of
knowledge, e.g. in predicting AMD disease progression ( [6]),
predicting DNA enhancers for gene expression programmes
( [7]), elections and demographic analysis based on satellite
images ( [8]), filtering data for gravitational-wave signals
( [9]). DL approach has also become one of the most used
approaches for natural language processing ( [10]) and speech
recognition ( [11]).
One of the most popular variations of DL architecture,
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) have significantly
boosted the performance of DL algorithms in computer
vision (CV) applications ( [12]), bringing it to several areas
of CV such as, object detection ( [13], [14], action recognition
[15], [16], pose estimation [17], [18], image segmentation
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Fig. 1. Defenses against adversarial attacks are divided in 3 categories:
Gradient Masking/Obfuscation, Robust Optimization, and Adversarial
Example Detection. The focus of this survey is Robust Optimization
which we subdivide in: Adversarial Training, Certified Defenses, and
Regularization Approach.
[19], [20], and motion tracking [21]. Starting with ImageNet
[22], proposed in 2012, the field of CNN’s have seen great
improvement with super-human performance in specific
tasks, providing solutions even to medical problems [23].
Fueled by the fact that new frameworks, libraries, and
hardware resources are being improved and made available
to the public and scientific community [24], [25], [26], Deep
Neural networks (DNN) are being improved constantly and
achieving new performance breakthroughs [27], [28], [29].
With the current maturity of DNN algorithms, its being
applied in solving safety and security-critical problems [30],
such as self-driving cars [31], [32], multi-agent aerial vehicle
systems with face identification [33], robotics [34], [35], social
engineering detection [36], network anomaly detection [37],
deep packet inspection in networks [38]. DNN applications
are already part of our day-to-day life (personal assistants
[39], product recommendation [40], biometric identification
[41]) and tend to occupy a bigger space as time passes.
As seen in many publications, DNN has been shown to
have human-level accuracy even for significantly complex
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2tasks such as playing games with no prior rule known, except
the current frames [42]. In contrast to the aforementioned
accuracy of DNN models, its been shown in earlier publi-
cations [43], [44], [45], that DNN models are susceptible to
small input perturbations, in most cases imperceptible to the
human eye. The results from this publications have shown
the facility with which small additive targeted noise to the
input image, makes models to misclassify objects which
before could be identified with 99.99% confidence. More
alarming is the fact that such models report high confidence
in the predictions. Such perturbations, which can fool a
trained model, are known as adversarial attacks. With such
alarming consequences, the study of adversarial attacks and
robustness against them became a great deal of research in
recent years.
A considerably large number of research papers is now
available concerning methods to identify adversarial attacks
and defend from incursions against the model [46], [47]. One
way of solving this issue is adding better intuition on the
models, through explainability [48], but such models do not
target the direct improvement of the model. On the other
hand, several approaches have been published to generate
models which are robust against adversarial attacks [49],
the target of the researchers is to introduce in their models’
layers of robustness such that the models are not fooled by
out of distribution examples, known or unknown attacks,
targeted or untargeted attacks. Guaranteeing the accuracy
of such models while safety is taken into consideration, is
of utmost importance for system architects, mainly making
them robust to the presence of adversarial attacks, noise,
model misspecification, and uncertainty. This survey aims to
bring together the recent advances in robustness for DNN’s,
pointing the main research directions being followed recently
to generate robust DNN models. We bring to light both
applied and theoretical recent developments.
Inspired by [50], we analyze the robustness of DNN’s
under the perspective of how adversarial examples can be
generated, and how defenses can be formulated against
such algorithms. In general words, we define the robustness
against adversarial attacks problem as a dual optimization
problem, in which the attackers try to maximize the loss
while the defenses try to minimize the chance of a model
being fooled by the attacker. In such formulation, current
existing models based in non-linear activation functions,
introduce non-linear inequality constraints in the optimiza-
tion, which generates an inherent trade-off between exact
solutions and scalability of the model. This trade-off comes in
the form of either exact slow solutions through mixed-integer
linear programming, or in approximations to the objective
function which either, relies on the existing attack methods
to provide a local heuristic estimation to the maximization
function, or approximations of the bounds of the constraints
or objective function to generate certification regions, in
which no adversarial example exists.
More specifically this paper presents the following contri-
butions:
1) We characterize defenses to adversarial attacks as a
min-max optimization problem, investigating solutions
involving heuristic approximation, exact solution, and
upper/lower bound approximations to generate models
robust to adversarial attacks.
2) We investigate, analyze, and categorize the most recent
and/or important approaches to generate adversarial
examples, as they are the basis to generate strong defenses,
through Adversarial (re)Training.
3) We investigate, analyze, and categorize the most recent
and important approaches to generate defenses against
adversarial attacks, providing a taxonomy, description of
the methods, and the main results in such approaches.
We organize this survey in the following manner. In sec-
tion 2 we describe taxonomies for both adversarial example
generation and defenses. We classify the adversarial models
concerning the time of the attack, information available
to the attacker, objective, and the algorithm computation
method. Moreover, we classify the perturbation type used
by the attackers. We divide the defense methods into three
categories, namely gradient-masking/obfuscation, robust
optimization, and adversarial example detection. We focus
this research in Robust Optimization, and further sub-
divide in 3 groups: Adversarial Training, Certified Defenses,
and Regularization Approach. In section 3, we describe
several relevant adversarial attacks, and summarize them in
Table 2. In section 4 we describe the most relevant results
in Robust Optimization, and provide a tree that maps these
publications to the 3 sub-groups of Robust Optimization. In
section 5 we discuss current challenges and opportunities in
robust defenses.
2 TAXONOMY OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AND
DEFENSES
We keep a consistent notation set along with the survey, and
for easiness of reading we summarize in Table 1 the most
used notations and symbols which we will use along with
this survey. For papers requiring some specific terms, we
define them in the section in which they are presented.
TABLE 1
Symbols and notations used in the mathematical definitions
Symbol Description
x original (clean, unmodified) input data
yˆ model’s prediction
t class label
x′ adversarial example
y′ target class of adversarial example
f(.) DL model
θ parameters of the model
δ perturbation generated by adv. algorithm
∆,  perturbation constraint
∇ gradient function
‖.‖p the lp-norm
L loss function (e.g., cross-entropy)
D Training data distribution
KL-divergence Kullback-Leibler divergence function
2.1 Attack Threat Model
Several attempts have been made to categorize attacks
on machine learning. We here distill the most important
aspects which characterize adversarial examples generating
models concerning their architecture. We focus on the aspects
that are most relevant to the discussion of adversarial
robustness. To that end, we classify the attacks concerning
3timing, information, goals, and attack frequency following
the proposed in [51]:
• Timing: A first crucial feature for modeling the adversarial
attacks is when it occurs. To that end we have two
possibilities, evasion and poisoning attacks. Evasion attacks
are the ones in the time of inference and assume the model
has already been trained. Poisoning attacks in general
targets the data, and the training phase of the model.
• Information: Another feature of the attack references the
information to which the attacker has access. In the white
box context the adversary has full access to information
concerning the model and the model itself, as opposed
to black box setting, in which very few or no information
is available. White box attacks refer to those in which
the adversary can unrestrictedly query the model for
any information, such as weights, gradient, model hyper-
parameters, prediction scores. Whereas in black-box attacks
the adversary has limited or no information about these
parameters, although may obtain some of the information
indirectly, for example, through queries. Some also define
grey-box attacks, in which attackers might only know the
feature representation and the type of model that was used
but have no access to dataset or the model information. A
fourth setting is called restricted black-box, or also known as
no-box attack. Under such an assumption, no information is
available to the attacker, and the research is mainly focused
on attack transferability. In wich the focus is to evaluate
the possibility of transferring the attack performed in one
DNN to the inaccessible objective model [52]. In this work,
we evaluate models in a binary setting, the adversary either
has comprehensive access to the DNN or black box having
limited access through queries, which can also provide
class scores.
• Goals: The attackers may have different reasons to target
a specific algorithm. But mostly the attacker has either a
specific goal, and needs the algorithm to output a specific
output, case in which it is a targeted attack, or just wants to
reduce the reliability of the algorithm by forcing a mistake.
In the latter, we have an untargeted attack.
• Attack Frequency: The attack on the victim’s model can
be either iterative or one-time. In the one-time, the opti-
mization of the objective function of the attacker happens
in a single step, whereas the iterative method takes several
steps to generate the perturbation.
2.2 Attack Perturbation Type
The size of the perturbation is in the core of the adversarial
attack, a small perturbation is the fundamental premise of
such models. When designing an adversarial example, the
attacker wants the perturbed input to be as close as possible
to the original one, in the case of images, close enough that
a human can not distinguish one image from the other. We
analyze the perturbation concerning scope, limitation, and
measurement.
• Perturbation Scope: The attacker can generate perturba-
tions that are input specific, in which we call individual, or
it can generate a single perturbation which will be effective
to all inputs in the training dataset, which we call universal
perturbation.
• Perturbation Limitation: Two options are possible, opti-
mized perturbation and constraint perturbation. The optimized
perturbation is the goal of the optimization problem, while
the constraint perturbation is the set as the constraint to
the optimization problem.
• Perturbation Measurement: Is the metric used to measure
the magnitude of the perturbation. The most commonly
used metric is the lp-norm, with many algorithms applying
l0, l2, l∞ norms.
2.3 Defense Methods
As seen in Figure 1 based on [53], we sub-divide the defenses
to adversarial attacks in 3 main categories: Gradient Mask-
ing/Obfuscation, Robust Optimization, and Adversarial
Example Detection, which are described as:
• Gradient Masking/Obfuscation: The core aspect of de-
fense mechanisms based on gradient masking is con-
structing models with gradients that are not useful for
attackers. The gradient masked/obfuscated models, in
general, produce loss functions that are very smooth in
the neighborhood of the input data. This smoothness
around training data points makes it difficult for exploiting
algorithms to find meaningful directions towards the
generation of an adversarial example.
• Robust Optimization: Is a defense strategy that is com-
posed of methods that improve the optimization function
either by adding regularization terms, certification bounds,
adversarial examples in the objective function, or modify-
ing the model to add uncertainty in the model layers.
• Adversarial Example Detection: Recent work has turned
to detect adversarial examples rather than making the
DNN robust against creating them. Detecting adversarial
examples is usually done by finding statistical outliers
or training separate sub-networks that can distinguish
between perturbed and normal images.
About the defense mechanisms, we focus this survey on
methods related to Robust Optimization. Among the several
publications in this survey, each author has its representation
and view of robust optimization. In general, even with
different notations and representations, most of the papers
we have surveyed fit the general representation of Robust
Optimization.
The training objective in a DL model is the minimization
of the desired loss. The objective is to ajust the model
parameters with respect to the labeled data, as seen in
Equation 1,
min
θ
L(θ, x, y) (1)
in which θ are the model parameters, x is the input to the
model, L is the defined loss function, and y is its true label.
With such a formulation, we seek to minimize w.r.t. θ, the
loss function. Such formulation fit the parameters to the data
points, such that f(x) yields predictions yˆ which are equal to
the true label y. In an adversarial setting this scene changes,
in which the objective is different,
max
δ≤∆
L(θ, x+ δ, y) (2)
in which we are searching for a perturbation δ, smaller than a
maximum perturbation ∆, capable of changing the decision
of the classifier from prediction yˆ, to y′. The restriction on
4the perturbation is a designer parameter which is in general
defined by the lp-norm.
Equations 1 and 2 do not incorporate the data distribution
or the restrictions which come from the fact that most of the
training datasets do not incorporate the true distribution of
the data in which the models will perform inference. Based
on the definition from [54], we have that, if D is the true
distribution of the data, a training set is draw i.i.d. from
D, and is defined as D = {(xi, yi) ∼ D}, for i = 1, ...,m.
And the empirical risk of a classifier, which is based on the
training set, is defined as:
R(F,D) = 1|D|
∑
(x,y)∈D
L(f(x), y)
in which |D| is the size of the training set D. With that
definition the empirical adversarial risk is defined in:
Radv(F,D) = 1|D|
∑
(x,y)∈D
L(f(x+ δ), y)
When dealing with adversarial defenses in the lenses of
Robust Optimization, the one first solution, is to solve the
combined worst-case loss, with the empirical adversarial risk
Radv , known as adversarial training.
min
θ
1
|D|
∑
(x,y)∈D
max
δ∈∆
L(f(x+ δ), y) (3)
The solution of Equation 3, require special handling or
a completely different formulation which define how we
categorize the defense mechanisms for adversarial attacks,
namely: Adversarial (re)Training, Bayesian Approach, Regu-
larization Approach, and Certified Defenses.
2.3.1 Adversarial (re)Training as a Defense Mechanism
The solution of Equation 3 requires solving the inner max-
imization (Equation 2), which is a high dimensional non-
convex optimization problem prohibitively hard to solve
exactly by standard optimization techniques. The most
popular approach to solve such a problem is by approxi-
mating Equation 2 with the use of a heuristics in which
we are searching for a lower bound for Equation 2. While
promising and shown to improve robustness even for large
models (ImageNet [55]), such models come with a drawback
which when instantiated in practice with the approximation
heuristics, they are unable to provide robustness guarantees
or certifications. This class of defenses even though very
practical to implement can not provide a guarantee that no
adversarial example exists in the neighborhood of x capable
of fooling f(.).
2.3.2 Certified Defenses
The problem stated in Equation 3, defines the general
objective of adversarial training. But as seen, even with
the best methods to find a local approximation to the
maximization problem, we are subjective to the effectiveness
of the attacking method. A way around this inconvenience
has been proposed in the literature, which is to exactly solve
the maximization problem or approximate to a solvable
set of constraints. To formally define Certified Defenses,
initially, we consider a threat model where the adversary is
allowed to transform an input x ∈ Rd into any point from
a set S0(x) ⊆ Rd. Such set represents the neighborhood of
the point x generated by either lp perturbations, geometric
transformations, semantic perturbations, or another kind of
transformation in x. In case of an lp perturbation, the set is
defined as S0(x) = {x′ ∈ Rd, ‖x− x′‖p < }.
We further expand the model f(.) as a function of its k
hidden layers and parameters θ, where
f(x) = fkθ ◦ fk−1θ ◦ · · · ◦ f1θ (4)
in which f iθ : Rdi−1 → Rdi denotes the nonlinear transfor-
mation applied in hidden layer i. The objective is to prove a
property on the output of the neural network, encoded via a
linear constraint:
cT fθ(x
′) + d < 0,∀x′ ∈ S0(x)
in which c and d are property specific vector and scalar
values.
To understand the complexity of the certification, based
on Equation 4, we define the layer-wise adversarial optimiza-
tion objective. For z1 = x, zi+1 = fi(Wizi + bi) :
max
z1,...,d+1
(ey − eytarg )T zd+1
s.t. z′1 ∈ S0,
zi+1 = fi(Wizi + bi), i = 1, . . . , d− 1,
zd+1 = Wdzd + bd
(5)
in which ei unit basis, vectors with value 1 in the class
ith position and zeros everywhere else. Such formulation
requires special handling given that we have a nonlinear
constraint defined by the activation function.
Several techniques have been proposed to solve such a
problem and they are within the scope of study on this survey.
The method to train certified neural networks is based on the
computation of an upper bound to the inner loss, as opposed
to a lower bound computed for adversarial training. These
methods are typically referred to as provable defenses as
they provide guarantees on the robustness of the resulting
network, under any kind of attack inside the threat model.
Typical methods to compute the certifications are based
on convex relaxations, interval propagation, SMT solvers,
abstract interpretation, mixed-integer linear programs, linear
relaxations, or combinations of these methods. We explore
the diverse techniques in subsection 4.3.
2.3.3 Regularization Approach
Regularization techniques focus on making small modifica-
tions to the learning algorithm, such that it can generalize
better. In a certain way, it improves the performance of the
model in unseen data. It prevents model over-fitting to the
noise data, by penalizing weight matrices of the nodes. In
the specific case of Robust Optimization, the objective of
regularization techniques is similar, but focusing on avoiding
that small variation on the input, can generate changes in
the decision of the algorithm. It does so by either expanding
the decision boundaries or limiting changes in the gradient
of the model.
Many regularization techniques have been proposed with
the most used being the lp based ones. The l2 regularization
5technique is introduced to reduce the parameters value which
translates to variance reduction. It introduces a penalty term
to the original objective function (Loss), adding the weighted
sum of the squared parameters of the model. With that, we
have a regularized loss LR defined as:
LR(x+ δ, y) = L(x+ δ, y) + λ ‖θ‖2
in which a small λ lets the parameters to grow unchecked
while a large λ encourages the reduction of the model
parameters. Regularization methods are not restricted to
Lp approaches and can involve Lipschitz Regularization, the
Jacobian Matrix, and other techniques that we survey on
subsection 4.2.
3 METHODS FOR GENERATING ADVERSARIAL AT-
TACKS
Studying adversarial attacks in the image classification
domain improve our insights, as we can visually analyze the
dissimilarities between disturbed and non-disturbed inputs.
Moreover, the image data, even though high dimensional,
are simpler represented than other domains such as audio,
graphs, and cyber-security data. Along this section, we’ll
revise the attack generating algorithms in the image clas-
sification domain which can be applied to standard deep
neural networks (DNN) and convolutional neural networks
(CNN). In which we classify in: white box, black box, and
applied real world attacks. In Table 2 we summarize all the
attacks described in this section, highlighting the distance
metric used, information access level, algorithm type, and
the domain it was applied in the specific publication.
In the following sub-sections, we list and describe the
most popular approaches for the adversarial attack in ML
models. We list them in chronological order and focus on
giving the most important details on these methods.
3.1 White-box Attacks
As stated, in white box attacks, there is no restriction in the
level of information to which the attacker can access. As a
consequence the adversary knows model parameters, dataset,
or any other information regarding the model. Under such
assumption, given a model f(.), an input (x, y), the main
objective is to produce x′, which is within certain distance
from the original x and maximizes the loss L(f(x+ δ), y).
max
δ∈∆
L(f(x+ δ), y)
Attack 
Setting Information Access
Back 
Propagation Query
White-box
Black-box
Restricted
x
Train Dataset
y
Class Scores
Weights, logit layer, softmax layer, 
algorithm, hidden layers, gradient, 
loss functions, activation  
Black-Boxx y
Restricted
Full Access Fast Unlimited
No Access Restriceted
No Access No Access
Fig. 2. White box and black box attacks diverge mainly on the information
the attacker have access to.
True Prediction: redbone
+	0.05 ∗ =
Attack delta: not random Prediction: hand_blower 	𝑃(ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑_𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) 	 = 	0.999
Fig. 3. By adding an unoticeble perturbation the dog, previously classified
as from the breed redbone, is classified as a Hand blower, with high
confidence.
3.1.1 Box-Constrained L-BFGS
In, [43], the existence of small perturbations capable of
misleading a classifier were first demonstrated. In the paper,
Szegedy et. al. proposed to compute an additive noise δ,
which could be added to the original input x, capable of
misleading the classifier but with minimal or no perceptible
distortion to the image. We find the optimal delta, δ, with:
min
δ
c ‖δ‖2
s.t. f(x+ δ) = y′,
all pixel in (x+ δ) ∈ [0, 1]
(6)
in which f(.) is the parameterized DNN model, y is the
true label, y′ is the target label. As is this is a hard problem.
Using a box constrained L-BFGS the authors proposed an
approximate solution to the problem stated as:
min
δ
c ‖δ‖2 + L(f(x+ δ), y′)
s.t. all pixel in (x+ δ) ∈ [0, 1]
(7)
In this model, Szegedy et. al., managed to generate images
that were visually indistinguishable from the original ones,
but were able to fool the classifiers into classifying them as
another class. This was the first result and publication which
has exploited this weakness of deep learning models.
3.1.2 Fast Sign Gradient Method
In , [56], introduced a one step adversarial attack framework.
The attack image, x′, is obtained by a simple additive disturb:
x′ = x+ δut
x′ = x− δtg
in which for the untargeted setting, δut, we obtain the
perturbation from:
max
‖δut‖p≤
L(f(x+ δ), y)
and in the the targeted setting, δtg , from:
max
‖δtg‖p≤
(L(f(x+ δ), y)− L(f(x+ δ), y′))
in which  is the ball defined normally by an lp-norm.
The core of fast sign gradient method maximize the
norm of the vector between originally labeled class and
the currently assigned label, while in the targeted setting, it
focus on minimizing the distance to the target class. As it is a
one-step algorithm, it is not very resilient to current defenses
but is very fast implementation. Figure 3 shows the attack of
an image and the false prediction.
63.1.3 DeepFool
The Deepfool attack proposed by [57], is a white box attack
which explores the boundaries of the classification model.
In the multi-class algorithm, Deepfool initializes with an
input x which is assumed to be within the boundaries of the
classifier model f(x). With an iterative process, the image
is perturbed by a small vector towards the direction of the
decision boundaries. The boundaries are approximated by
linear functions, more specifically a hyperplane, defined
in the algorithm as lˆ. At each step, the perturbations are
accumulated to form the final perturbation to the image.
With smaller perturbations than in FGSM ( [56]), the authors
have shown similar or better attack success rate.
3.1.4 Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
The Jacobian-based Saliency Map attack (JSMA) differs from
most of the adversarial attack literature with respect to the
norm it uses on the perturbation restriction. While most of
the attacks focus on the l∞ or l2 norms, JSMA, proposed
in [58], focus on the l0 norm. Under this norm, penalizes
the change in a binary way, if the pixel has been changed
or not, opposed to l2 based algorithms which takes into
consideration the size of the change in the pixels.
In this attack, Papernot et. al., calculates the Jacobian of
a score matrix F . The model executes the attack in a greedy
way. It modifies the pixel which has the highest impact on
the model’s decision. The Jacobian Matrix is defined as:
JF (x) =
∂F (x)
∂(x)
= {∂Fj(x)
∂xi
}x×j
it models the influence of changes in the input x to the
predicted label yˆ. One at a time pixels from the unperturbed
image are modified by the algorithm in order to create a
salience map. The main idea of salience map is the correlation
between the gradient of the output and the input. It is a guide
to the most influential variables of the input, or the ones that
probably can deceive the classifier with less manipulation.
Based on that, the algorithm performs modifications in the
most influential pixel.
3.1.5 Projected Gradient Descend (PGD)
Also known as the basic iterative method, was initially
proposed in [59]. It is based on the FGSM, but instead a single
step of the projected gradient descend, it iterates through
more steps, as in:
δ := P (δ + α∇δL(f(x+ δ), y))
in which P denotes the projection over the ball of interest.
With such formulation, the PGD, requires more fine-tuning,
in choosing the step size α. In [54], Madry et. al. proposed
an iterative method with a random initialization for δ.
3.1.6 Carlini and Wagner Attacks (CW)
In [60], 3 lp-norm attacks (l0,l2,l∞) were proposed as a
response to [61], which proposed the use of Distillation as a
defense strategy. In their paper, Papernot et. al., successfully
presented a defense mechanism capable of reducing the
effectiveness of the FGSM and L-BFGS. CW proposes to
solve the same problem stated in FGSM, which is given an
input x find a minimal perturbation δ capable of shifting
the classification prediction of the model. The problem is
addressed as:
min
δ
c ‖δ‖p + L(f(x+ δ), y′)
s.t. (x+ δ) ∈ [0, 1]n
(8)
in which L(f(x+δ), y′) = maxi6=y′(Z(x′)i)−Z(x′)y)+, and
Z(x) = z are the logits. As the algorithm minimizes the
metrics L(.), it finds the input x′ that has larger score to
be classified as y′. As we search for the value of c, we look
for the constant which will produce the smaller distance
between x and x′.
3.1.7 Ground Truth Adversarial Example (GTAE)
So far most of the attacks, even if motivated by the generation
of new defenses, are independent of the defense algorithm.
In the algorithm proposed by [62], the certified defense
proposed in [63], is used as a base for the optimization
and search for adversarial examples.
The algorithm abstract the θ and dataset (x, y) with the
use of an SMT solver, and solves the system to check if there
exist x′ near x, within the established norm distance, which
can cause a misclassification. The ground truth adversarial
example is found by reducing the size of  up to the point that
the system can no longer find a suitable x′. The adversarial
example is considered the x′ found with the immediately
larger . It is the first method to calculate an exact provable
solution to a minimal perturbation which can fool ML models.
In contrast, as stated by the authors, the fact that the model
relies on an SMT solver, restrict the applicability of the
algorithm to models with no more than a few hundred
nodes. This attack has been revisited by [64] and [65].
3.1.8 Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Different from the previous methods, the universal adversar-
ial perturbation (UAP), proposed in [66], search for a single
perturbation capable of fooling all samples from the training
dataset. The perturbations, independent of the input, are also
restricted to not be detected by humans. The perturbations
are constructed based on:
Px∼D(f(x) 6= f(x+ δ)) ≥ β, s. t. ‖δ‖p ≤ 
in which  defines the size of the perturbation based on
an lp-norm and β defines the probability of an image
sampled from the training dataset being fooled by the
generated perturbation. In this case, the algorithm optimizes
the probability of fooling the classifier.
The method to calculate the universal perturbations is
based on the DeepFool algorithm, in which the input is
gradually pushed towards the model’s decision boundary. It
differs from DeepFool in the fact that instead of pushing a
single input, all members of D are modified in the direction
of the decision boundary. The perturbations, calculated for
each image, are accumulated in a gradual manner. The
accumulator is then projected back towards the specified
B ball, of radius . Its been shown that with variations of
4%, a fooling accuracy of 80% has been achieved.
73.1.9 Shadow Attack
In [67], an attack targeting certified defenses was proposed. In
their work, they target defenses that certify the model with
respect to a radius defined by the lp-norm. One intuitive
idea to construct a certified defense is to check within a
certain radius B of input, the existence of a perturbation
δ, capable of changing the decision of the classifier. The
shadow attack is constructed to leverage this premise, and
construct a perturbation outside of the certification zone.
It is claimed that after labeling an image, these defenses
check whether there exists an image of a different label
within  distance (in lp metric) of the input, where  is a
security parameter selected by the user. If within the B
ball all inputs are classified with the same label, then the
model is robustly certified. Their model targets not only
the classifier but also the certificate. It is done by adding
adversarial perturbations to images that are large in the lp-
norm and produce attack images that are surrounded by a
large ball exclusively containing images of the same label.
In order to produce images that are close to the original, in
a perception way, but can fool the classifier, they use the
following objective function:
max
y′ 6= y, δ
−L(θ, x+ δ|y′)− λcC(δ)
− λtvTV (δ)− λsDissim(δ)
(9)
in which L(θ, x + δ|y¯) refers to the adversarial training
loss, λcC(δ) is a color regularization term, λtvTV (δ) is a
smoothness penalty term, and λsDissim(δ) guarantees that
all color channels receive similar perturbation.
3.1.10 Other Attacks
The presented attacks are just part of many more which have
been published in many different venues. Here we list some
other relevant attack methods available in the literature.
• EAD: Elastic-net attack - Similar to L-BFGS the algorithm
in [68] proposes to find the minimum additive perturbation,
which misleads the classifier. Differently it incorporates an
association of the norms l1 and l2. It has been shown that
strong defenses against l∞ and l2 norms still fail to reject
l1 based attacks.
• Objective Metrics and Gradient Descend Algorithm
(OMGDA) - The algorithm proposed by [69], is very
similar to DeepFool, with the optimization of the step size.
Instead of utilizing a fixed and heuristically determined
step size in the optimization, in Jang et al., the step size
utilizes insights from the softmax layer. The step size is
determined based on the size of the desired perturbation
and varies over time.
• Spatially Transformed Attack (STA) - In [70], instead of
generating changes in the intensity of the pixels, the au-
thors have proposed a method based on small translational
and rotational perturbations. The perturbations are still not
noticeable by the human eyes. Similarly in [71] the spatial
aspect of the input is also exploited for the adversarial
example generation.
• Unrestricted Adversarial Examples with Generative
Models (UAEGM) - Based on AC-GAN ( [72]), [73], has
proposed the use of generative networks to generate exam-
ples which are not restricted to being in the neighborhood
of the input data. The generated attacks, are not necessarily
similar to the ones in the dataset but are similar enough to
humans not notice and fool the classifiers.
3.2 Black-Box Attacks
Under Black box restriction, models are different from the
currently exposed white box, with respect to the information
the attacker has access to. In most cases, the adversary does
not have any or some information about the targeted model,
like the algorithm used, dataset, or parameters, as seen in
Figure 2. An important modeling challenge for black-box
attacks is to model precisely what information the attacker
has about either the learned model or the algorithm. In this
sub-section, we list the most relevant methods for black
attack generation.
3.2.1 Practical Black-Box Attacks (PBBA)
While assuming access to the information of the model
enables a series of attacks, the work in [74], introduces the
possibility of attacking models about which the attacker
has less knowledge. In this work, no knowledge about the
architecture is assumed, only some idea of the domain of
interest. It is also limited the requests for output sent to
the model, which requires the attacker to choose wisely
the inference requests from the victim’s model. To achieve
the goal, Papernot et. al. introduce the substitute model
framework. The attack strategy is to train a substitute
network on a small number of initial queries, then iteratively
perturb inputs based on the substitute network’s gradient
information to augment the training set.
Algorithm 1 Substitute Model
1: Input: Substitute dataset S0.
2: Input: Substitute model architecture F .
3: while ρ ≤ epochs do
4: Label S0 based on queries from original model
5: Train substitute model based on (3).
6: Augment dataset based on Jacobian, Sρ ← Sρ+1
7: return
With the boundaries of substitute model adjusted to be
close to the original model, any of the methods presented in
the previous section can be used to generate the perturbed
image.
3.2.2 Zeroth Order Optimization Based Attack
In Chen et al. [52], in the attack also known as ZOO, the
authors assume accessibility to both, the input data and the
confidence scores of the model in which they target their
attack. They differ from [74] in the fact that the model does
not focus on transferability (creating a substitute model) to
achieve the adversarial examples. In their work, they propose
a zeroth-order optimization attack which estimates the
gradient of the targeted DNN. Instead of traditional gradient
descend, they use order 0 coordinate SGD. Moreover, to
improve their model and enable the adversarial example
generation, they implement dimensionality reduction, hierar-
chical techniques, and importance sampling. As the pixels are
tuned, the algorithm observes the changes in the confidence
scores.
8Fig. 4. The HopSkipJumpAttack. (a) With binary search find the boundary
of the decision. (b) Generate an estimate of the gradient near the
decision limit. (c) Update the decision limit point with the use of geometric
progression. (d) Do a binary search and update the estimate of the
boundary point. Image Source: [77]
Similar to the ZOO, in the one-pixel attack [75], it is
proposed the use of the score confidence to perturb the input
and change the decision of the classifier. This paper focuses
on modifying a single pixel of the input. With the use of
differential evolution, the single pixel is modified in a black-
box setting. The authors base the update of the perturbation
in the variation of the probability scores for each class.
3.2.3 Query-Efficient Black-Box Attacks
One of the biggest challenges in black-box attacks is the fact
that many inference models have mechanisms to restrict the
number of queries (when cloud-based or system embedded),
or the inference time can restrict the number of queries. One
line of research in black-box models looks into making such
models more query efficient, for example, the work from [76],
based on natural evolution strategies reduces by 2 or 3 order
of magnitude the amount of information requests sent to
the model to successfully generate a misclassified perturbed
image. The algorithm set queries in the neighborhood of the
input x. The output of the model is then sampled, and these
samples are used to estimate the expectation of the gradient
around the point of interest.
The algorithm sample the model’s output based on the
queries around the input x, and estimate the expectation
of a gradient of F on x. More on the topic, [77], proposes
a family of algorithms based on a new gradient direction
estimate using only the binary classification of the model. In
their work, it is included l∞ and l2 norm-based attacks as
well as targeted and untargeted attacks. Figure 4 shows an
intuition on how the gradient is updated and the boundaries
of the decision are used to generate the adversarial attack.
Algorithm 2 shows how the dimensionality reduction dr is
defined. Moreover, in the search for query efficient black box
attack, [78] introduces a method that is independent of the
gradient based on Bayesian optimization and Gaussian pro-
cess surrogate models to find effective adversarial examples.
In the model it is assumed that the attacker has no knowledge
of the network architecture, weights, gradient or training data
of the target model. But it is assumed that the attacker can
query model with input x, to obtain the prediction scores on
all classes C. They restrict the perturbation to the l∞ norm.
Their objective is to maximize over the perturbations:
δ∗ = arg max
δ
[log(f(xorigin + g(δ))t)
− log(
C∑
j 6=t
f(xorigin + g(δ))j)]
s.t. δ ∈ [−δmax, δmax]dr
(10)
The Bayesian optimization proposed to improve the query
efficiency requires the use of a surrogate model to approxi-
mate the objective function, in their work a Gaussian Process
is used. Moreover to define the next query point is defined
by an acquisition function. A big differential in their work
is the fact that instead of searching in a high-dimensional
space for a perturbation δ, they utilize a function to reduce
the dimensionality of the perturbation and later reconstitute
to the true image size.
Algorithm 2 Bayesian selection of dr
Input: Decoder g(.), observation Ddt−1 = g(δi), yit−1i=1
where g(δi) ∈ Rd and a set of possible dr : drjNj=1
Output: The optimal reduced dimension dr∗ and corre-
sponding GP model.
1: for j = 1, ..., N do
2: Dd
r
j
t−1 = {g−1(g(δi)), yi}t−1i=1, . g−1(g(δi)) ∈ Rd
r
j
3: Fit a GP model to Dd
r
j
t−1 and compute its maximum
marginal likelihood p(Ddt−1|θ∗, drj)
4: dr∗ = arg maxdrj∈drjNj=1
p(Ddt−1|θ∗, drj) and its
5: return
3.2.4 Attack on RL algorithm
In [79], a method for generating adversarial examples in
reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms was proposed. In
RL, an adversarial example can either be a modified image
used to capture a state or in the case of this publication,
an adversarial policy. It is important to highlight that an
adversarial policy is not a strong adversary as we have
in two-player games, but one that with a certain behavior
triggers a failure in the victim’s policy. In this paper, a black-
box attack is proposed to trigger bad behaviors in the victim’s
policy. The victim’s policy is trained using Proximal Policy
Optimization and learns to "play" against a fair opponent.
The adversarial policy is trained to trigger failures in the
victim’s policy. Figure 5 shows the difference between an
opponent’s policy and an adversarial manipulated policy.
Also in the paper, it was shown the dependence of the
size of the input space and the effectiveness of adversarial
policies. The greater the dimensionality of the observation
space under the control of the adversary, the more vulnerable
the victim is to attack.
3.3 Physical World Attack
The research presented so far is mostly focused on applying
the attacks in virtual applications and controlled datasets,
Fig. 5. In the first sequence, a strong opponent has to enter collide with
the agent to prevent it from winning the game. In the second line, in the
adversarial example, the opponent simply crumbles on the floor, which
triggers a bad behavior in the victim’s policy. Image Source: [79]
9but the great concern about the existence of adversarial
examples is the extent to which they can imply severe
consequences to the users of the system. With that objective,
we dedicate this session on exploring publications with real-
world applications and consequences clearly stated.
In [80], road signs were physically attacked by placing a
sticker in a specific position of the sign. Their attack consisted
of initially finding, in a sign image, the location with the most
influence for the decision of the classifier. For that objective,
an l1norm was used because it renders sparse perturbations
in the image, making it easier to locate the modification
patches. Based on the defined location, an l2norm was used
to identify the most appropriate color for the sticker.
Moreover, as face recognition is becoming very popular
as a biometric security measure it is the focus of several
adversarial attacks. We highlight 4 attacks in face recognition
and identification.
• Evaluation of the robustness of DNN models to Face
Recognition against adversarial attacks - In this pub-
lication Goswami et al. [81] evaluates how the depth of
the architecture impacts the robustness of the model in
identifying faces. They evaluate the robustness with respect
to adversarial settings taking into consideration distortions
which are normally observed in a common scene. These
distortions are handled with ease by shallow networks
on the contrary of deep networks. In their approach,
they’ve used Open-Face and VGG-Face networks, and
have achieved a high fooling rate. It is important to notice
that in their attack no restrictions are made in the visibility
of the perturbations.
• Adversarial Attacks on Face Detectors using Neural
Net based Constrained Optimization In this work, also
focusing on prevent face identification, [82] has generated
an attack, based on Carlini and Wagner attack, which was
able to fool R-CNN. Their perturbations are not visible in
the adversarial example.
• Generating Adversarial Examples by Makeup Attacks
on Face Recognition - In this research, [83] implement a
GAN network to generate make-up perturbation. When
the perturbation is applied to the face, the classifier shifts
its decision to the target class.
• Efficient decision-based black-box adversarial attacks on
face recognition - Dong et al. [84] propose an evolutionary
attack method. The proposed adversarial example gener-
ator is constrained in a black-box setting. The algorithm
focus on reducing the number of dimensions of the search
space by modeling the local geometry of the search vectors.
Such an algorithm has been shown to be applicable to most
recognition tasks.
3.3.1 Other Attacks
In the field of Cyber-security machine learning models are,
in general, applied to detect malware, malicious connections,
malicious domain classifier, and others. In Suciu et al. [85] an
evaluation of the robustness of current malware detection
models is performed. The authors retrain the model in a
production-scale dataset to perform the evaluation. With
the new data, the model which was previously vulnerable
to attacks was shown to be stronger and architectural
weaknesses were reported. The work of Suciu et al. [85],
explores how attacks transfer in the cyber-security domain,
and mainly the inherent trade-off between effectiveness and
transferability. With respect to malicious connection and
domain, Chernikova et al. [86] builds a model that takes into
consideration the formal dependencies generated by the
normal operations applied in the feature space. The model
to generate adversarial examples simultaneously consider
both the mathematical dependencies and the real-world
constraints of such applications. The algorithm focus on
determining the features with higher variability and the ones
with a higher correlation with these features. This search is
performed for each iteration. All the identified features are
modified but constrained to preserve an upper bound on
the maximum variation of the features. The upper bound
respects physical-world application limitations.
In the Cyber-Physical domain, several publications
demonstrate the brittleness of ML models and the generation
of adversarial examples. [87] generated adversarial examples
to an iCub Humanoid Robot. The attack proposed simply
extends over the attacks in [88]. The main aspect to be
considered in this paper is the fact that it highlights the high
consequences of the adversarial examples in the decision
process of safety-critical applications. Moreover, in self-
driving cars several attacks have been derived like DARTS (
[89]) and the work of [90] which shows the attack of traffic
signs, the latter with real experiments. In a different sensor
type, the work of [91] demonstrates the attack to a LIDAR
sensor, in which they attack the point cloud image.
Moreover in [92], a novel technique was proposed to
attack object tracking algorithms. In their approach, the
bounding box is attacked in a single frame, which is enough
to fool the algorithm and generate an offset in the placement
of the bounding box. Such an attack would be critical to
self-driving cars to recognize the position of obstacles, other
vehicles, and pedestrians on the road.
4 DEFENSE MECHANISMS BASED ON ROBUST OP-
TIMIZATION AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
From the examples presented so far, we see that both DNN’s
and CNN’s are very unstable locally and susceptible to
misclassify examples with perturbations that are barely
perceivable by the human eye. Several works have reported
structured algorithms and formulations to improve the
robustness of ML models employing robust optimization.
The goal of this section is to visit the most commonly
identified techniques to achieve robustness (through the
eyes of the optimization), namely Adversarial Training,
Bayesian Approach, Certified Defenses, and Regularization
Approaches, which are summarized in Figure 6.
We summarize in Table 3 the results presented in the
surveyed papers. We’ve compiled the information available
in each of those papers concerning the error rate under the
tested conditions. Each of the papers has different evaluation
criteria and conditions. The dataset is highly influential in
the accuracy of the model. To that end, we’ve been careful
to better express the conditions in which the models were
evaluated. Papers in which the results were not clear or have
used a very specific metric are not listed in these tables to
keep consistency among the results.
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TABLE 2
Dichotomy of the Attacks
WHITE BOX ATTACKS
Algorithm Metric Stepa Domainb
L-BFGS ( [43]) l2 Iter. Im-C
FGSM ( [56]) l∞, l2 S-Stp Im-C
Deepfool ( [57]) l2 Iter. Im-C
JSMA ( [58]) l2 Iter. Im-C
PGD ( [54]) l∞, l2 Iter. Im-C
C and W ( [60]) l0,l2,l∞ Iter. Im-C
GTAE ( [62]) l0 SMT Im-C
UAP ( [66]) l∞, l2 Iter. Im-C
EAD ( [68]) l1, l2 Iter. Im-C
OMGDA ( [69]) l2 Iter. Im-C
STA ( [70]) Spt-Var Iter. Im-C
UAEGM ( [69]) l2 Iter. Im-C
Shadow Attack ( [67]) lp Iter. Im-C
RoadSign ( [80]) l1,l2 Iter. S-R
FRA1 ( [81]) NR S-Stp F-Rec
FRA2 ( [82]) l2 Iter. F-Rec
FRA3 ( [83]) l1 Iter. F-Rec
CSA2 ( [86]) l2 Iter. Cyb-Sec
CPA1 ( [87]) l2 Iter. Cyb-Phy
CPA3 ( [90]) l0 Iter. Cyb-Phy
CPA4 ( [91]) NR Iter. Cyb-Phy
CPA5 ( [92]) l1, l2 Iter. Cyb-Phy
BLACK BOX ATTACKS
Method Metric Stepa Domainb
PBBA ( [74]) lp Iter. Im-C
ZOO ( [52]) lp Iter. Im-C
One-Pixel ( [75]) l0 Iter. Im-C
DBA ( [93]) l2 Iter. Im-C
HopSkipJumpAttack ( [77]) l2,l∞ Iter. Im-C
UPSET & ANGRI ( [94]) l∞ Iter. Im-C
RLAttack ( [79]) NR Iter. RL
FRA4 ( [84]) l2 Iter. F-Rec
CSA1 ( [85]) l∞ Iter. Cyb-Sec
CPA2 ( [89]) l1 Iter. Cyb-Phy
a - Iter.: Iterative, S-Stp.: Single Step; b - Im-C.: Image Classification,
S-R.: Signal Recognition, F-Rec.: Face Recognition, Cyb-Sec.: Cyber-
Security, Cyb-Phys.: Cyber-Physical, RL.: Reinforcement Learning
4.1 Defending through Adversarial (re)Training
After the first introduction of adversarial examples ( [43] and
[88]), defense mechanisms to train robust neural networks
were built based on the inclusion of adversarial examples to
the training set. Models trained using adversarial training
with projected gradient descent (PGD) were shown to be
robust against the strongest known attacks. This is in contrast
to other defense mechanisms that have been broken by new
attack techniques. In this section, we explore robustness
mechanisms that explicitly or implicitly address the robust-
ness in deep learning through either adding adversarial
examples in the dataset or incorporate them in the objective
function for the optimization.
4.1.1 Harnessing Adversarial examples
In his work, [56] Goodfellow et. al. suggests the use of
adversarial examples in the training process to improve the
robustness of machine learning models. It is a very simple
idea, which worked for the proposed configuration. The
algorithm, using FGSM in an untargeted setting, would
generate a set of adversarial examples x′, which were fed to
the learning algorithm with the true label, (x′, y). Important
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Fig. 6. Summary of the defense mechanisms sub-divided in the 3
categories, namely: Adversarial Training, Certified Defenses, and Regu-
larization Approach.
to notice the limitation of such a framework, it is robust
against FGSM attacks, but susceptible to other attacks, such
as iterative methods. Such weakness was pointed in a later
work by [107], which also shown single-step attacks could
fool such a defense.
In [98], it is studied an adaptation of FGSM in adversarial
training. The initially proposed FGSM training was shown
to create a massive over-fitting in the model having it not
robust to iterative attack methods such as PGD. In this new
publication, Wong et. al., proposes small modifications in
the initialization of the FGSM algorithm to accommodate
randomness as a way to prevent over-fitting in the training
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process. Instead of having a fixed initialization, the perturba-
tions are generated as follows:
1) δ = Uniform(−, )
2) δ = δ + αsign(∇δL(fθ(xi + δ), yi))
3) δ = max(min(δ, ),−)
The addition of the sampling from a uniform distribution
to the initial perturbation allowed the algorithm to better
estimate the inner maximization, improving the robustness
of adversarially trained models with FGSM, maintaining the
speed of the adversarial example generation.
4.1.2 Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adver-
sarial Examples
In their publication, Madry et. al. [54], among an extensive
discussion of robustness in the machine learning models,
propose to incorporate iterative methods to approximate the
inner maximization problem shown in:
min
θ
(
1
D
∑
(x,y)∈ D
max
δ∈∆(x)
L(f(x+ δ), y)) (11)
where δ is the perturbation, f(.) is the model.
In this publication, the authors have approximated the
inner maximization problem with the PGD attack method,
but it is important to highlight in this formulation, that the
model will be as robust as the attack it was trained on. If new
and more efficient adversarial examples are presented to the
model at inference time, nothing can be stated regarding the
robustness of the model.
4.1.3 Ensemble Adversarial Training
In their research [107], the authors show that when the
model is trained directly on single/iterative methods, the
model trains on examples crafted to maximize a linear
approximation of the loss. Moreover, such a model training
method converges to a degenerate global minimum. These
artifacts near the inputs x obfuscate the approximation
of the loss. According to their findings, the model learns
weak perturbations rather than generating robustness against
strong ones.
As a countermeasure, the paper implements a framework
in which the model is trained with adversarial examples
from similar classifiers. In their method, the generation
of adversarial examples is dissociated from the network
being optimized. Under such circumstances, their proposed
framework approximates to the work in which black-box
attacks are generated with the use of auxiliary models, and
consequently makes their approach more resilient to it. In
the algorithm, to train classifier F0, they train other sets
of classifiers, F1, F2, ..., Fn, generate adversarial examples
for these classifiers, and use the adversarially generated
examples to train F0. Their defense model even for the
ImageNet dataset, has shown robustness against black-box
attacks.
In a different work, using a similar concept, [106] pro-
poses the augmentation of the model robustness with the
use of random noise layers to prevent the strong gradient
attacks. It is a gradient masking attack, but the authors
position the algorithm as an improvement to ensemble
adversarial defense, by stating that the defense is equivalent
to ensembling an infinite number of noisy models. Such
ensembling is claimed by the authors to be equivalent to
training the original model with a Lipschitz regularizing
term. They’ve achieved significant results against Carlini
and Wagner’s strong attacks. Algorithm 3 shows the steps to
implement the proposed algorithm.
Algorithm 3 Random Self-Ensemble
Training
1: for iter = 1,2,... do
2: Randomly sample (xi, yi) in dataset
3: Randomly generate  ∼ N (0, σ2) for each noisy layer
4: Compute the noise gradient, g = ∇θL(f(θ, xi), yi)
5: Update weights: θ′ ← θ − g
Testing Given a test image x, initialize p = (0, ..., 0)
6: for j = 1, 2, ..., Ensembles do
7: Generate 
8: Forward propagation and generate probability out-
put, pj
9: Update, p← p+ pj
10: Return class with with maximum probability
More recently in [105], a mixed-precision ensemble was
proposed. Ensemble of Mixed Precision Deep Networks for
Increased Robustness (EMPIR) is based on the observation
that quantized neural networks often show higher robustness
to adversarial attacks than full precision networks. Such
models sacrifice accuracy. EMPIR combines the accuracy
of full models with the robustness of quantized models by
composing them in an ensemble.
4.1.4 Principled Adversarial Training
In [104], Sinha et. al. have presented a method to solve the
outer maximization with a Lagrange relaxation approach. By
doing so, they presented both, an adversarial training method
based on the min-max formulation and a method to prove the
robustness of the model. In addition to the adversarial train-
ing, a penalty is added on the loss term to help regularize the
learning. It is used as a Lagrangian formulation to generate
this penalty. It perturbs the underlying data distribution
within a Wasserstein ball. The model’s efficiency is restricted
to smooth losses, but under such constraint, it can achieve a
moderate level of robustness. The computational or statistical
cost, when compared to empirical risk minimization is small.
4.1.5 Network Robustness with Adversary Critic
The Adversarial Training formulation is an optimization
problem that naturally involves minimization and maximiza-
tion. In [103] and [116] the GAN framework is proposed
to generate the noisy perturbations, which will lead to the
adversarial example. On the other-hand the discriminator of
the network act as a critic which will discern if the presented
input x is adversarial or not. In the work, it is highlighted
that the generated adversarial networks are also robust to
black-box attacks, showing similar or better performance
than state-of-the-art defense mechanisms.
4.1.6 Adversarial Logit Pairing
In [54] Madry et. al. suggested the use of the Equation 11 to
adversarial train the model, and achieve robustness in their
model. Kannan et al. [102] implements a mixed version of
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this defense. Instead of training the robust model only on
adversary perturbed images, they incorporate a mix of clean
(x, y) and perturbed (x′, y) batches, which they call mixed
mini-batch PGD (M-PGD).
In their work, they go beyond to analyze the fact that
most of the adversarial training framework, train the models
with information that x′ should belong to the class t, but the
model is not given any information indicating that x′ is more
similar to the actual sample x than any other belonging to the
same class. To that extent, they propose another algorithm
called adversarial logit pairing.
For a model f(.) trained on a mini-batch Γ of clean
examples {x1, x2, ..., xm} and corresponding adversarial
examples {x′1, x′2, ..., x′m}, with f(x) mapping the input to
a prediction. With L(Γ, θ) being the cost function used to
perform the adversarial training, the adversarial logit pairing
consists of minimizing the loss:
L(Γ, θ) + λ 1
m
m∑
i=1
L(f(xi), f(x′i))
4.1.7 ME-Net
ME-Net [101] introduces the concept of utilizing matrix
estimation as a way to augment the adversarial sample size
and eliminate the perturbations from adversarial examples.
The training procedure to ME-Net is described as follows,
the algorithm creates a mask in which each pixel is preserved
with probability p, and set to zero with probability 1 − p.
For each input image x, n masks are applied, with different
pixel drop probability. The generated masked images, X ,
are then processed through a Matrix Estimation algorithm,
which would obtain the reconstructed images Xˆ . The DNN
model is trained on the reconstructed images, which can be
further processed with the use of more adversarial training
techniques. For inference, to each input x, a mask is randomly
sampled from the pool of masks obtained in the training time,
applied to x, and then reconstruct to generate xˆ. The process
of masking and reconstructing the images is claimed by the
authors to reduce the effects of adversarial perturbations in
the image.
4.1.8 Robust Dynamic Inference Networks
In [99], an input-adaptive dynamic inference model to
the adversarial defense is proposed. In this method each
input, regardless of clean or adversarial samples, adaptively
chooses which output layer to take for its prediction. There-
fore, a large portion of input inferences can be terminated
early when the samples can already be inferred with high
confidence. The benefit of the use of such models comes
from the fact that the multiple sources of losses provide much
larger flexibility to compose attacks (and defenses), compared
to the typical framework. In this work, a methodology to
attack and defend in such models is proposed.
4.1.9 Defending against Occlusion Attacks
In [97], the authors investigate defenses against physically
realizable attacks, more specifically they investigate defenses
to attacks in which part of the object is occluded by a physical
patch. It’s been demonstrated that adversarial training with
either PGD or Randomized Smoothing did not improve
the robustness of the models significantly. In their work,
they propose, implement, and use a Rectangular Occlusion
Attack(ROA). The ROA enabled the emulation of physical
attacks in the virtual world and the consequent training of
adversarial resistant models.
4.1.10 Robust Local Features for Improving the generaliza-
tion of Adversarial Training
In their research,Song et al. [96] investigates the fact that
when models are trained with no adversarial techniques
they gather better information about local features, which
improves the model’s generalization ability. Opposed, DNN
models which were adversarially trained tend to have a bias
in favor of a global understanding of the features. In their
work, they propose a method to train adversarial robust
models, which are biased towards local features. In their
work they define the Random Block Shuffle, to randomize
the features of input inside the image. Such an approach
prevents the adversarial learning method from learning only
global features. The model learns from a combination of
shuffled and unshuffled images.
LRLFATP (F ;x, y) =LRLFLPGDAT (F ;x, y)+
ηLRLFTPGDAT (F ;x, y)
LRLFATT (F ;x, y) =LRLFLTRADES(F ;x, y)+
ηLRLFTTRADES(F ;x, y)
(12)
In the loss defined in Equation 12, the factor η balances the
contribution between the local feature-oriented loss and the
global oriented.
4.1.11 Misclassification Aware Adversarial Training
In [95], the authors propose the analysis of the misclassifi-
cation examples, intending to improve the accuracy of the
model against perturbed inputs. To perform such a study
they’ve trained a classifier with 10-step PGD, obtaining 87%
training accuracy, they extracted the 13% misclassified ex-
amples and sampled 13% correctly classified examples from
the training dataset. The examples originally misclassified
by the model, are the ones that impact the most the final
robustness. Compared to standard adversarial training the
final robustness drops drastically if misclassified examples
are not perturbed during adversarial training. In contrast,
the same operation on sampled correctly classified examples
only slightly affects the final robustness.
Based on the observations a regularization term is pro-
posed to incorporate an explicit differentiation of misclassi-
fied examples. Initially they propose a Boosted Cross Entropy
loss, defined as:
BCE(p(xˆ′i, θ), yi) =− log(pyi(xˆ′i, θ))
− log(1−max
k 6=yi
pt(xˆ
′
i, θ))
in which pt(xˆ′i, θ) is the softmax on logits of xi belonging to
class t. With that the objective function is defined as:
LMART(θ) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
L(xi, yi, θ)
L(xi, yi, θ) := BCE(p(xˆ′i, θ), yi))
+ λKL(p(xi, θ)||p(xˆ′i, θ), yi))(1− pyi(xi, θ))
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4.1.12 Input Transformation Methods
Input transformation methods propose to train the network
in transformed images, such as bit-depth reduction, JPEG
compression, total variance minimization, and image quilting
or an ensemble of these methods to improve the robustness
of the model.In [128], the use of JPEG compression was
proposed as a countermeasure of the pixel displacement
generated by the adversarial attacks. In [129], a combina-
tion of total variation minimization and image quilting is
used to defend against strong attacks. Even-though these
transformations are nonlinear, a neural network was used to
approximate the transformations, making them differentiable,
and consequently easier to obtain the gradient. Different
in [130], an ensemble of weak transformation defenses
was proposed to improve the robustness of the models,
among the transformations included in the defense are: color
precision reduction, JPEG noise, Swirl, Noise Injection, FFT
perturbation, Zoom Group, Color Space Group, Contrast
Group, Grey Scale Group, and Denoising Group.
4.2 Regularization Techniques
As shown in subsection 3.1, several algorithms depend on
the model’s gradient to estimate the local optima pertur-
bations which will fool the classifier. A stream of research
towards adversarial robust optimization, look into applying
regularization approaches to reduce the influence of small
perturbations in the input on the output decisions. In this
section, we review some relevant publications in the field in
which the author’s objective is to improve the robustness of
the model.
4.2.1 Towards DNN Architectures Robust to Adversarial
Examples
In their work, Gu et. al. [127] propose the use of Contractive
Autoencoder. To regularize the gradient, they add a penalty
to the loss in the back-propagation concerning the partial
derivatives at each layer. By incorporating a layer-wise
contractive penalty (in partial derivatives), they show that
adversarial generated from such networks have significantly
higher distortion. In their approach, the network could still
be fooled by adversarial examples, but the level of noise
necessary to fool such a network is considerably higher than
standard networks in which there is no contractive penalty.
4.2.2 Robust Large Margin Deep Neural Networks
The work presented in [126] analyzes the generalization
error of DNN’s through their classification margin. In their
work, they initially derive bounds to the Generalization Error
(GE) (adversarial attacks as consequence) and express these
bounds as a dependence of the model’s Jacobian Matrix (JM).
In their work, it was shown that the depth of the architecture
does not affect the existence of a GE bound, conditioned to
fact that the spectral norm of the JM is also bounded, around
the training inputs. With this definition a weigh and batch
normalization regularizer is derived. The regularizer is based
on the bound derived based on the JM.
4.2.3 Input Gradient Regularization
Parseval networks [125] is a layer-wise regularization method
to reduce the networks variability to small disturbances in the
input x. The work starts with the principle that DNN’s are
a composition of functions presented by layers. To keep the
variability of the output controlled, they propose to maintain
the Lipschitz constant small at every hidden layer (for fully
connected, convolutional, or residual layer). For that, they
analyze the spectral norm of the weight matrix.
In [124], Ros et. al. based on the same principle of gradient
regularization, propose the use of such techniques to improve
both the robustness and interpretability of Deep Neural
Networks. The authors claim that raw input gradients are
what many attacks use to generate adversarial examples.
Explanation techniques that smooth out gradients in back-
ground pixels may be inappropriately hiding the fact that the
model is quite sensitive to them. They hypothesize that by
training a model to have smooth input gradients with fewer
extreme values, it would not only make the model more
interpretable but also more resistant to adversarial examples.
Their gradient regularization is given by:
θ∗ = arg min
θ
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
−ynklog(fθ(Xn)k)
+ λ
D∑
d=1
N∑
n=1
(
∂
∂xd
K∑
k=1
−ynklog(fθ(Xn)k))2
in which λ specifies the penalty strength. The goal of this
update is to ensure that if any input changes slightly the KL
divergence between predictions will not change significantly.
4.2.4 DeepDefense
Yan et al. [123] propose the algorithm called DeepDefense
focusing on the improvement of the robustness of the DNN
models, which is an regularization method based on the
generated adversarial perturbation. Similar to adversarial
(re)Training the algorithm incorporates the adversarial gen-
eration the loss function. It does not occur as shown in
Equation 3, differently it is presented as:
min
θ
∑
k
L(xk, yk, θ) + λ
∑
k
R(−‖δxk‖p‖xk‖p
)
in which we see that at the same time that the loss is
minimized a regularization term based on the perturbation
δxk is added to penalize the norm of the adversarial per-
turbations. The penalty function R(.), treats the samples
different depoending if they were correctly classified or
not, it increases monotonically when the sample is correctly
classified. With such a behavior the function gives preference
to those parameter settings which are able to resist even to
small
‖δxk‖p
‖xk‖p .
4.2.5 TRADES
In their work, Zhang et. al. [121] states the intrinsic trade-off
between robustness and accuracy. In their work, they derive
a differentiable upper bound for the natural and boundary
errors of the DNN model. To derive such bound, the error
generated by the adversarial examples (called robust error)
is decomposed in two parts: 1 - the natural misclassification,
and 2 - the boundary errors. The bounds are shown to be
the tightest overall probability distributions. Based on these
bounds a defense mechanism called TRADES is proposed.
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TABLE 3
Results of defenses based on Adversarial (re)Training and Regularization
ADVERSARIAL (RE)TRAINING
Publication Architecture Dataset Norm Adversarial  Error Rate
Goodfellow et al. 2015 [56] DNN MNIST l2 L-BFGS 0.25 17.9%
Tramer et al. 2018 [107] Inception ResNet v2 ImageNet l∞ Step-LL 16/256 7.9%
Madry et al. 2018 [54] ResNet CIFAR-10 l2 PGD 8 54.2%
Liu el al. 2018 [106] VGG16 CIFAR-10 l∞ C&W 8/256 10%
Sen et al. 2020 [105] AlexNet ImageNet l∞ C&W 0.3 70.64%
Kannan et al. 2018 [102] ResNet-101 ImageNet l2 PGD 12/255 55.60%
Hu et al. 2020 [99] ResNet38 CIFAR-10 l2 PGD 8/255 30.29%
Wong et al. 2020 [98] PreAct ResNet18 ImageNet l∞ R-FGSM 2/255 56.7%
Song et al. 2019 [96] ResNet w32-10 CIFAR-100 l∞ PGD 0.03 68.01%
Wang et al. 2020 [95] ResNet-18 CIFAR-10 l∞ PGD 8/255 45.13%
REGULARIZATION APPROACH
Publication Architecture Dataset Norm Adversarial  Error Rate
Cisse et al. 2017 [125] ResNet CIFAR-100 SNR(x,δ), l∞ FGSM 33 47.4%
Yan et al. 2018 [123] ResNet ImageNet l2 FGSM 2.43E-3 50%
Zhang et al. 2019 [121] ResNet CIFAR-10 l∞ C&W 3.1E-2 18.76%
Xie et al. 2019 [55] ResNet-152 ImageNet l∞ PGD 16 57.4%
Mao et al. 2019 [120] Modified LeNet Tiny ImageNet l∞ C&W 8/255 82.52%
Shafahi et al. 2019 [131] Wide-ResNet-32 CIFAR-100+→10+ l2 PGD 8 82.3%
In its core, the algorithm still minimizes the natural loss,
consequently increasing the accuracy of the model, but at the
same time, it introduces a regularization term, which induces
a shift of the decision boundaries away from the training
data points. The expansion of the decision boundaries can
be seen in Figure 7.
4.2.6 Metric Learning for adversarial Robustness
[120] focuses on learning a distance metric for the latent
representation of the input. Through an empirical analysis,
the authors have observed that inputs under PGD adversarial
attacks shift its latent representation to a false class. The
shift in the latent representations spread in the false class
and become indistinguishable from the original images in
the class. In their paper, they’ve added a new constraint to
the model with metric learning. Their model implements
a variation of the naive triplet loss, called TLA (triplet loss
adversarial training), which overcome the variance of the
adversarial data over the false class. The TLA works by ap-
proximating the samples from the same class, independently
if they are adversarial or unperturbed samples, and enlarge
the boundary distance concerning other classes.
4.2.7 Adversarially Robust Transfer Learning
In [131], a study on transfer learning for robust models
is performed. In their paper, they robustly train a Wide-
ResNet 32-10 [132] using the algorithm proposed in [54]. In
Fig. 7. In the left we see the boundaries of a model trained with standard
DNN. In the right the boundaries of the decision are pushed further from
the data points, showing not so sharp transitions compared to naturally
trained methods. Image Source: [121]
their first experiment, they sub-divide the model in blocks
of layers and analyze the impact of changing the number
of unfrozen blocks in the transfer learning process. It was
seen that when only the fully connected layer and the
batch normalization blocks were re-trained, the network
had similar or improved robustness in the new domain.
Opposed, when more blocks were re-trained the accuracy
and robustness dropped drastically. The authors claimed that
the robust model’s feature extractors act as filters that ignore
the irrelevant parts of the images.
With the intent of improving the overall performance
of classifiers transferred from a robust source model by
improving their generalization on natural images, the authors
proposed an end-to-end transfer learning model with a no-
forgetting property. To do so, they only fine-tune the feature
extraction parameters θ. It consists basically of the addition
of a regularization term to the loss of the model.
min
θ,w
L(f(x, θ), y, w) + λlp(f(x, θ), f0(x, θ∗))
4.3 Certified Defenses
Certified defenses try to theoretically find certificates in
distances or probability to certify the robustness of DNN
models. These methods are explored in this section.
4.3.1 Exact Methods
The work of [63], was a big first step in the direction of
formalizing methods to certify the robustness of neural net-
works. In their work, also, to provide a formulation for SMT
solver for the ReLU activation function, they’ve proven safety
in a small neural network for aircraft collision prediction.
They were able to use their solver to prove/disprove local
adversarial robustness for their example DNN for a few
arbitrary combinations of input x and disturbances δ. In
their experiments, the verification took from few seconds to
a few hours depending on the size of the perturbation, with
bigger perturbations taking longer to be verified.
Expanding over the Reluplex idea, the work in [119],
provide a more complete framework to prove formulas
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over a DNN. The key concept of AI2 is the use of abstract
interpretation to approximate mathematical functions with
an infinity set of behaviors into logical functions witch are
finite and consequently computable. To evaluate a DNN
they propose to over-approximate the model in the abstract
domain with the use of logical formulas capable of capturing
certain shapes. Figure 8 shows the exemplification of how
the abstraction of the layers is used to evaluate properties in
the DNN.
Fig. 8. From left to right, initially the algorithm generates an abstract
element which encompass all perturbed images. It propagates through
all the abstractions of the layers. The verification is successful if all
images are in the same classification group in the end.Image Source:
[119]
Building on the work of [119], Singh et al. [118] published
a work in which not only the ReLU activation function is
available, but also Sigmoid and TanH. In their work, they
implement a parallel version of the layer transformation
which improved significantly the verification speed.
4.3.2 Estimating the lower bound
In their work,Hein et al. [117] the search of model robustness
through the optics of formal guarantees. They’ve proposed
in their work, a proven lower bound which establishes the
minimal necessary perturbation to change a model’s decision.
"We provide a guarantee that the classifier decision does not change
in a certain ball around the considered instance" [117]. More-
over, based on the proposed Cross-Lipschitz Regularazation
method, they show the increase in the adversarial robustness
of the models trained with such regularization. The generated
bound is defined as:
‖δ‖p ≤ max>0 min Ψ
Ψ = {min
j 6=c
fc(x)− fj(x)
maxy∈Bp(x,) ‖∇fc(y)−∇fj(y)‖q
}
It is known that an exact solution for the optimization prob-
lem which leads to the certification of DNN’s is intractable
for large networks. In [116], they propose CLEVER (Cross
Lipschitz Extreme Value for nEtwork Robustness). In their
work, the lower bound is defined as the minimum  necessary
to be added in the input to change the decision of the model
in an adversary setting.
Based on extreme value theory, the CLEVER metric is
attack agnostic and is capable of estimating the lower bound
for an attack to be effective in any model. But it restricts itself
on providing a certification, it only provides an estimate of
the lower bound. Improving from CLEVER, [115] provides a
certified lower bound for multi-layer perceptrons restricted
to ReLU activation. In [114], CROWN is proposed extending
the exact certification to general activations. In [113] the
same research group proposed the CNN-Cert a framework
to certify more general DNN.
In Zhang et al. [133], a mix between inner bound propa-
gation and linear relaxation is proposed. Linear relaxation
of Neural Networks is one of the most popular methods
to provide certified defenses and uses linear programming
to provide linear relaxation, also known as the (convex
adversarial polytope). Even though such methods generate
an implementation that is tractable and solvable, they are
still very demanding of computational resources. IBP on
the contrary is less complex and brings more efficiency
when optimizing verifiable networks. Also known as interval
bound propagation (IBP), are in general loose during the
initial training phase which generates instabilities in the
training and makes the model very sensitive to the hyper-
parameters.
The model proposed by Zhang et. al. in [133] unifies
linear-relaxation and IBP. They generate a model which is
very efficient for low output dimensions. It is used the convex
relaxation in the backward pass of the bound, and the IBP in
the forward bound pass of ther network. The optimization
problem solved in CROWN-IBP can be defined as:
min
θ
E(x,y)∈D[λL(x, y, θ) + (1− λ)L(−(Ψ) + Φ), y, θ]
Ψ = (1− β)mIBP (x, )
Φ = βmCROWN−IBP (x, )
in which Ψ is the IBP bound, Φ is the CROWN-IBP bound,
and m(x, ) is the combination of both bounds.
4.3.3 Upper Bounding the adversarial Loss
In the works of [112] and [111] the certification of robustness
is searched through means of defining an upper bound for
the adversarial loss. For an adversarial loss defined as:
Ladv = max
x′
{maxi 6=yZi(x′)− Zy(x′)}
subj. to x′ ∈ B(x)
both try to find a larger certificate C(x, F ) when compared
to the loss of the perturbed example. If the certificate is
smaller than 0, it is guaranteed that the true label will have
the bigger score, and it can be stated that within this distance
the model is safe. The works differ on the means to find
the certificate. [112] transforms the problem into a linear
programming problem. [111] derives the certificate using
semidefinite programming. An upper-bound estimation
based on statistical methods is also proposed in Webb et
al. [134].
4.3.4 Randomized Smoothing
Randomized Smoothing is a set of algorithms based on a
mathematical formalist inspired in cryptography, differential
privacy (DP). This set of algorithms explore the connection be-
tween DP and robustness against norm-bounded adversarial
examples in ML.
A classifier f : Rd → [0, 1]k which maps the input x with
probability [0, 1] to any of the d classes, is said to be -robust
at x if:
F (x+ δ) = c(x),∀δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ 
moreover, if f is L− Lipschitz then f is -robust at x with:
 =
1
2L
(PA − PB)
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Fig. 9. The smoothed classifier at an input x. In the left the decision
boundaries for a classifier f , for each class represented in differente
colours. The doted lines represents the sets of the distribution N (x, σI).
In the right the class probabilities, and the lower bound for class pA and
the upper bound for each other class pB . Image Source: [136]
where, PA = maxi∈[k] fi(x) and PB is the second-max.
Neural networks are known for being non-lipschitz. Recent
work, from Lecuyer et al. [135] have proposed to smoothing
the classifier, as in:
fˆ(x) = EZ∼N (0,Id)(f(x+ σZ))
which is proven to be lipschitz.
Cohen et al. [136] propose the use of a smoothed classifier
to generate a tighter certification bound. The proposed
certification radius is defined by:
 =
σ
2
(Φ−1(PA)− Φ−1(P¯B)),
where PA the lower bound for the top class probability, P¯B
is the upper bound probability for all other classes, and
Φ−1(.) is the inverse of the standard Gaussian cumulative
distribution function. In which  is large when the noise
level σ is high, the probability of top class A is high, and
the probability of each other class is low. Figure 9 shows the
decision boundaries and the certification radius proposed by
Cohen et al. [136].
In [109], the authors propose an attack-free and scal-
able method to train robust deep neural networks. They
mostly build upon Randomized Smoothing. The randomized
smoothing classifier is defined as g(x) = Eηf(x + η), in
which η ∼ N (0, σ2I). Different from adversarial training as
proposed in the original technique, the authors propose to
robustly optimize including certification radius as part of the
defined objective.
4.3.5 MMR-Universal
In [110], a provable defense against all lp-norms are proposed,
for all p ≥ 1. The case studied is the non-trivial case in which
none of the lp balls are contained in the others. For an input
with dimensions d, the robustness to an lp perturbation
requires d
1
p− 1q q > p > q for p < q. In which p is the
radius of the ball defined by the lp-norm. In their paper a
minimal lp norm of the complement of the union of l1, l∞
norm, and its convex hull is derived as:
min
x∈Rd\C
‖x‖p =
1
( 1∞ − α+ αq)
1
q
for C the convex hull formed by the union of the l1 and
l∞ norm balls, α = 1∞ −
⌊
1
∞
⌋
, 1p +
1
q = 1, d ≥ 2 and
1 ∈ (∞, d∞). Based on this derivation, a lower bound for
the robustness at point x is defined and a regularizer term
is expressed in term of the distances and the lower bound
MMR-Unirversal. The regularizer is then incorporated in the
loss function to improve the robustness of the model:
L(xi, yi) = 1
T
T∑
i=1
Lc−e(f(xi), yi)
+MMR-Universal(xi)
During the optimization, the regularizer aims at pushing
both the polytope boundaries and the decision hyperplanes
farther than l∞ and l1 distances from the training point x, to
achieve robustness close or better than l∞ and l1 respectively.
5 CHALLENGES AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES
We’ve discussed and presented results in three methods for
generating robust machine learning algorithms: adversar-
ial (re)training, regularization, and certified defenses. The
search for an optimal method to strengthen DL algorithms
against adversaries has a solid structure but still requires
a significant effort to achieve the major objective. While a
great number of new algorithms have been published every
year, both in the realm of attacks and defenses, no algorithm
based on adversarial (re)Training or attack generation can
claim to be the final and optimal method. At the speed
new defenses arise, attackers exploit the gradient or other
nuances from these defensive algorithms to generate their
effective low norm perturbation. The reason for this arms
race, is the fact that the defenses are not absolute, or that
while trying to solve maximization in Equation 3, only an
empirical approximation is used, and no global optimality
is achieved. Moreover as the algorithms fail to account for
all possible scenarios, there will always be an example in the
neighborhood of x, such that ‖x− x′‖p ≤ δ.
Other than optimizing Equation 3, with an empirical
solution, certified defense mechanisms present a formal
alternative to achieve robust deep learning models, but this
certified solution comes with the cost of efficiency, and high
computational cost. It derives from Equation 5. The non-
linear equality constraint for each layer of the neural network
is unsolvable with standard techniques, and several methods
have been proposed to achieve the optimal solution namely:
linear relaxations, convex relaxations, interval propagation,
abstract interpretation, mixed integer linear programming,
or combination of these methods. We see great research
opportunities and challenges in further improving such algo-
rithms. They are in the early stages of development, in which
the abstractions and formal approximations for the non-
linearity constraints shown in Equation 5 are not optimized
for parallel computation as their numerical counterparts are.
Such restriction makes it almost impractical to have such
mechanisms to be applied in larger datasets. More in the
topic, approximations of the optimization constraints either
by a lower bound or upper bound has shown to speed-up
the training process of such algorithms, but at the cost of
having over-estimated bounds for the maximum allowed
perturbation. These algorithms have not yet demonstrated
high accuracy in large datasets corrupted by adversaries, or
smaller datasets with high level of corruption. Part of the
issue comes from the imposed convex relaxations. As they
are not tight enough, it requires the verification algorithms
to explore a bigger region, than actually necessary to verify
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the existence of adversarial examples in the neighborhood of
the input.
Moreover as seen in [67], even certified defenses can be
broken when a big enough disturbance is applied to the
model. It is arguable that even with the rigorous mathe-
matical formulation of the defenses and certifications the
constraint imposed by lp norm is weak. Most of the models
can not achieve certifications beyond  = 0.3 disturbance
in l2 norm, while disturbances  = 4 added to the target
input are barely noticeable by human eyes, and  = 100,
when applied to the original image are still easily classified
by humans as belonging to the same class. As discussed by
many authors, the perception of multi-dimensional space
by human eyes goes beyond what the lp norm is capable of
capturing and synthesizing. It is yet to be proposed more
comprehensive metrics and algorithms capable of capturing
the correlation between pixels of an image or input data
which can better translate to optimization algorithms how
humans distinguish features of an input image. Such a metric
would allow the optimization algorithms to have better
intuition on the subtle variations introduced by adversaries
in the input data.
As we seek to apply machine learning algorithms in safe-
critical applications, a model that works most of the time is
not enough to guarantee safety of such implementations.
It is imperative to know the operational restrictions of
the algorithm, and the level of corruption they can safely
handle. For such, formally certifying the algorithms is crucial,
but increasing the neighborhood around the input that
the certification can be guaranteed is fundamental for the
practical application of current available techiniques.
6 CONCLUSION
Training safe and robust DNN algorithms is essential for their
usage in safe-critical applications. This paper studies strate-
gies to implement adversary robustly trained algorithms
towards guaranteeing safety in machine learning models. We
initially provide a taxonomy to classify adversarial attacks
and defenses. Moreover, we provide a mathematical formula-
tion for the Robust Optimization problem and divide it into
a set of sub-categories which are: Adversarial (re)Training,
Regularization Approach, and Certified Defenses. With
the objective of elucidating methods to approximate the
maximization problem, we present the most recent and
important results in adversarial example generation. Fur-
thermore, we describe several defense mechanisms that
incorporate adversarial (re)Training as their main defense
against perturbations or add regularization terms that change
the behavior of the gradient, making it harder for attackers
to achieve their objective. In addition, we surveyed methods
which formally derive certificates of robustness by exactly
solving the optimization problem or by approximations using
upper or lower bounds.
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